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DOES PROXIMITY TO CONFLICT AFFECT TOURISM:
EVIDENCE FROM NATO BOMBING
Marina Tkalec∗
Ivan Zˇilic´†
Abstract
Although conﬂict, war, violence, and terrorism naturally aﬀect tourism, research that identi-
ﬁes possible channels through which these eﬀects propagate is scarce. We explore if the adverse
eﬀects are channeled through proximity to conﬂict areas. We use the conﬂict in Kosovo in
1999 and the country Croatia as a quasi-natural experiment and take advantage of the speciﬁc
north-west to south-east orientation of Croatian Adriatic counties to identify the eﬀect of NATO
bombing in Kosovo on tourism outcomes as well as the potential proximity channel. Using data
on the population of Croatian ﬁrms in the 1993–1999 period and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
identiﬁcation strategy we ﬁnd that tourism companies’ revenues decreased signiﬁcantly due
to NATO bombing, especially in accommodation services and in companies with 50 or more
employees. By analyzing heterogeneous eﬀects with respect to the distance of the ﬁrm from
Kosovo—using a linear and a more ﬂexible model—we argue that within-country proximity to
conﬂict is not a signiﬁcant channel through which the negative eﬀect propagates.
Keywords: conﬂict; diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences; ﬁrm-level; tourism.
JEL classiﬁcation: C31, D74, L6, L83, Z3.
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UTJECˇE LI BLIZINA SUKOBU NA TURIZAM:
SLUCˇAJ NATO BOMBARDIRANJA
Sazˇetak
Iako sukobi, rat, nasilje i terorizam prirodno utjecˇu na turizam, rijetka su istrazˇivanja koja
identiﬁciraju moguc´e kanale kojima se ti ucˇinci sˇire. U ovom radu istrazˇujemo sˇire li se sˇtetni
ucˇinci putem kanala blizine podrucˇju sukoba. Sukob na Kosovu 1999. godine i Hrvatsku, a
posebno njezinu speciﬁcˇnu sjeverozapadno-jugoistocˇnu orijentaciju jadranskih zˇupanija, koris-
timo kao kvazieksperiment kojim identiﬁciramo ucˇinak bombardiranja NATO-a na Kosovu na
turizam u Hrvatskoj kao i potencijalni kanal blizine sukobu. Koristec´i podatke o hrvatskim po-
duzec´ima u razdoblju od 1993. do 1999. godine i identiﬁkacijsku strategiju razlike-u-razlikama,
pronalazimo da su prihodi od turizma bili znacˇajno smanjeni zbog bombardiranja NATO-a,
posebice u poduzec´ima koja pruzˇaju usluge smjesˇtaja i u poduzec´ima s 50 ili viˇse zaposlenih.
Analizom heterogenih ucˇinaka s obzirom na udaljenost poduzec´a od Kosova—koristec´i linearni
i ﬂeksibilniji model—tvrdimo da unutar zemlje blizina sukobu nije znacˇajan kanal kojim se sˇiri
negativni ucˇinak bombardiranja.
Kljucˇne rijecˇi: sukob; razlika-u-razlikama; poduzec´a; turizam.
JEL klasiﬁkacija: C31, D74, L6, L83, Z3.
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1 Introduction1
Tourism—as an activity largely based on pleasant experiences—is fundamentally incompatible with
conﬂict, war, violence, and terrorism. While the 21st century has so far been statistically the
most peaceful one, numerous violent conﬂicts and comprehensive media coverage have brought
dreadful events into the cities and homes of many people. For example, according to the Institute
for Economics and Peace (2016) the number of countries experiencing a terrorist attack in 2015
amounted up to 92 with 29,376 people dying during these terrorist events. When wars and other
sorts of conﬂict are added, the number goes up by a high degree. While these horriﬁc events are
important issues on their own, it remains to see how they aﬀect tourism. Recent crisis events in
popular tourist destinations—for example, attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, France and Spain—might
shift tourist demand towards places which are perceived safer.
While the literature on the nexus between violent conﬂict and tourism is (unfortunately) growing,
the empirical evidence on the channels of these adverse eﬀects is scarce. In this paper, using a
dataset on the universe of Croatian ﬁrms and the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy,
we explore how the NATO bombing of Kosovo and the rest of the Yugoslavian2 territory in 1999
aﬀected revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector in Croatia—which, at the time, was a neighboring
country of the conﬂict-infected Yugoslavia.
Given that ﬁrm-level data contain information on ﬁrm location, we are able to explore not only the
magnitude, sign and signiﬁcance of the eﬀect, but also analyze a potential channel of within-country
proximity to conﬂict. In particular, we are interested if the adverse eﬀect is stronger if the ﬁrm
in the tourism sector is closer to the bombing site. In order to answer this question we use the
north-west to south-east orientation of the seven Croatian Adriatic counties. The utmost north
county, Istria, is less than 100 km away from Venice, while the utmost south Dubrovnik-Neretva
county bordered with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was only 160 km from Kosovo (where
most of the NATO bombings took place). If a heterogeneous eﬀect with respect to proximity is
established—tourism ﬁrms closer to conﬂict (ones on the south) suﬀered more in 1999—we can
argue that within-country proximity to conﬂict is a signiﬁcant channel of this adverse eﬀect.
We ﬁnd compelling evidence that revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector in Croatia decreased
signiﬁcantly due to NATO bombing, especially in accommodation services and in companies with
1This work has been fully supported by TVOJ GRANT@EIZ.
2One must take into account that in 1999, Yugoslavia was composed of Serbia and Montenegro only, and that
Kosovo was a part of Serbia.
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50 or more employees. The magnitude of the eﬀect is around -16.6% and this result is stable
across numerous robustness checks—with diﬀerent samples and diﬀerent speciﬁcations. However,
constructing a measure of distance between the municipality of the ﬁrm’s headquarters and NATO
bombing site (Kosovo), and using this proximity as an intensity of exposure to conﬂict, we do not
ﬁnd any evidence that closer ﬁrms experienced more adverse eﬀects. Results of both linear and a
more ﬂexible speciﬁcation yield the same conclusion: within-country proximity to conﬂict does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the magnitude of the negative eﬀect.
The contribution is twofold. First, we document the eﬀect of the Kosovo conﬂict and the NATO
bombing in 1999 on Croatian tourism thus exploring a part of economic consequences of conﬂict
by proxy. Second, we use the conﬂict in Kosovo and the country of Croatia as a quasi-natural
experiment and take advantage of the speciﬁc north-west to south-east orientation of Croatian
Adriatic counties to identify and estimate a potential within-country proximity channel. While
the results established in this paper are certainly context—i.e. Croatian-speciﬁc, they argue that,
given the violent conﬂicts in popular tourist destinations, this research can facilitate understanding
of negative eﬀects of conﬂict on tourism and their channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we review the literature,
from conﬂict and terrorism studies to tourism research, in order to motivate our research idea,
while section three provides details on the NATO bombing of Yugoslavian territory. Section four
describes the data, methodology, and the identiﬁcation strategy, while in section ﬁve we present
our baseline results. This is followed by a discussion on the channel of adverse eﬀects, while the
last section concludes the paper.
2 Tourism and Conﬂict
Existing tourism and conﬂict literature mostly documents events that cause tourism to tumble and
on occasion tries to measure the size of the eﬀect, the geographical reach, and the time it took
tourism to stabilize after the unagreeable event(s). Enders & Sandler (1991) argue that a terrorist
attack in Spain caused tourist arrivals to drop by more than 140,000 and that the eﬀects lasted for
at least three months.
Enders et al. (1992) explore a number of terrorist attacks over a long period of time. They show
that terrorist attacks deter tourism as revenues in the tourism industry fall even six to nine months
after the attack. Goodrich (2002) describes the impacts of the September 11 terrorist attacks on
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the US economy. He argues that the tragedy had been particularly adverse for the airline industry
and the manufacture of airplanes. The hotel industry was also seriously damaged as during the
ﬁrst three months hotel bookings declined by 20 to 50 percent. Other economic sectors that were
also hit were casinos, sports tourism, etc. He also found that some states suﬀered more than others
as tourism is more important for their economy (e.g. Florida, California, and Nevada).
Pizam & Smith (2000) analyze terrorism events and their impact on tourist destinations and the
tourism industry. They ﬁnd that in three-quarters of terrorist events that occurred between 1985
and 1998, the acts caused a decline in tourism demand with the median length of 1 to 3 months,
with more than one-third causing a decline of 4 to 6 months. On a broader note, Wall (1996) ﬁnds
that instability and violence aﬀect not only locations under conﬂict but also wider parts stretching
to the whole region, country and neighboring countries.
The only study in tourism research that uses ﬁrm-level data and explores the inﬂuence of terrorist
events is the one by Fleischer & Buccola (2002) who build a supply and demand model of the Israeli
hotel industry where they measure how foreign tourists respond to terrorist events. Their results,
although only marginally reﬂecting the eﬀects of terrorism on tourism, show there is a large and
statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of terrorism in Israel on foreign demand quantity measured
by overnight stays. Our research is probably closer to Collier & Duponchel (2013), who were the
ﬁrst to use ﬁrm-level data to study eﬀects of war in Sierra Leone. They use the geographical vari-
ation in the magnitude of conﬂict to estimate the eﬀect of violence on ﬁrm growth. They ﬁnd that
ﬁrms in areas that were more exposed to civil war were smaller ﬁrms.
3 Background of the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavian Territory
In the spring of 1998, the autonomous province of Serbia populated by up to 90% ethnic Albanians,
Kosovo, was hit by conﬂict between the Albanian guerrilla movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army,
and the Serbian police. In the aftermath of the demise of Yugoslavia and wars in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the UN was on standby to stop a new war in the region. After the mediation
broke down, in March 1999, NATO started the three-month long aerial bombardment of Yugoslavian
territory (mostly Kosovo and Serbia). In June 1999, NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
agreed a withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. At the time, Croatia directly bordered with the
Republic of Serbia on the east of the country, while on the south, the Dubrovnik-Neretva county
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bordered with the Republic of Montenegro (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Map of Aﬀected and Surrounding Areas
Austria
Vienna
Croatia
Dubrovnik
Italy
Prishtina
Kosovo
Venice
Source: Google Maps.
Although there was no direct border with the autonomous province of Kosovo, the instability in
the region at the time inﬂuenced the Croatian economy to a large extent, tourism in particular.
Aggregate data suggest that tourist arrivals in 1999 dropped by 725 thousand and overnight stays
by 4.726 million (almost entirely attributed to foreign tourists) when compared to the previous
year. The following tourist season, 2000, in which the Kosovo-Serbia conﬂict ceased and 12 months
after the NATO bombing, the number of tourist arrivals and overnight stays not only surpassed
the level of 1999, but overshot the level of 1998, resulting in an annual increase in overnight stays
amounting up to 12.057 million. To sum up, after the end of the war in Croatia in 1995, arrivals
and overnight stays have been growing, except in 1999. When exploring possible reasons for such
an irregularity in the data, one can think only of the NATO bombing of Serbia as it is a known fact
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that instability, wars, and terrorism signiﬁcantly aﬀect tourism. Data for other economic sectors in
Croatia at the time do not share the same pattern, which is reason more in favor of our hypothesis.
4 Methodology and Data
While the aggregate data indeed indicate an adverse eﬀect of NATO bombing, one needs to control
for other determinants of tourism performance in order to estimate the magnitude of the eﬀect.
Therefore, we turn to a ﬁrm-level dataset using the universe of Croatian ﬁrms and a more credible
identiﬁcation strategy. In this section we explain in detail the methodology behind the empirical
strategy. First we establish the eﬀect on the whole sector and we proceed to explore whether this
eﬀect is propagated by proximity to bombing sites.
In order to estimate and document the eﬀect of NATO bombing on Croatian tourism performance,
we use the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) identiﬁcation strategy (Angrist & Pischke, 2014). Intu-
itively, DD compares the diﬀerences between outcomes of a treated unit—in our case revenues of
ﬁrms in the tourism sector—before and after the treatment (NATO bombing), with the outcomes
of control units—ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector—before and after the treatment. Using this
method we are able to control for the overall momentum of economic activity, thus extracting only
the causal eﬀect of NATO bombing on tourism.
More formally, we estimate the following equation:
Yistl = α+ β treatis + γ postit + δDD (treatis × postit) + φ′Xit + ζl + ηs + eistl (1)
where:
 Yistl is the log(1 + revenues) of a ﬁrm i in sector s in time t in location l.
 treatis is an indicator if a ﬁrm i is in sector s which is treated. If a ﬁrm is in the tourism
sector, treatis takes value 1, and if the ﬁrm is in the manufacturing sector, treatis takes value
0; therefore β reﬂects diﬀerences in log revenues between the two sectors.
 postit is an indicator if a ﬁrm i is operating in treated time t. If a ﬁrm is operating in 1999,
afteris takes value 1, and 0 otherwise; therefore γ reﬂects a common time change in log
revenues of both sectors.
 treatis × afteris is an interaction term which identiﬁes the treatment. If a ﬁrm i is in the
tourism sector in 1999, this interaction takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise—if any of the
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two conditions is not met. Hence δDD is the causal parameter of interest—eﬀect of NATO
bombing on log revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector.
 Xit, ζl and ηs are time-variant ﬁrm-level controls (employment, assets, and debt), location
ﬁxed eﬀects, and sector ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively.
In order to estimate Equation 1 we use ﬁrm-level data obtained from annual balance sheets and
proﬁt and loss reports that are available for the universe of Croatian ﬁrms from 1993 to 1999.
Apart from standard business indicators—revenues, proﬁt, number of employees, assets, debt, cap-
ital, etc.—county and municipality identiﬁers are available for all ﬁrms which enables us to construct
a measure of geographical proximity to NATO bombing sites and thus explore the adverse eﬀect
channel. Table 1 presents the summary statistics, while Figure 2 presents the histogram of log
revenues of both treated and control ﬁrms.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
1993–1999 sample (N=38,578) 1998–1999 sample(N=14,177)
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Log revenues 13.16 2.91 13.16 2.95
Treated sector 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39
Treated period 0.19 0.39 0.52 0.50
Distance from Kosovo (in km) 514.58 87.75 514.95 88.63
Employees 26.67 90.35 23.55 81.90
Accommodation 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21
Hotels 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Vacation establishments 0.005 0.07 0.01 0.08
Camping sites 0.004 0.06 0.005 0.07
Other accommodation 0.002 0.04 0.002 0.04
Food and beverage 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.35
Restaurants 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
Catering 0.003 0.06 0.004 0.06
Beverage service 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28
Adriatic region 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47
4.1 Identiﬁcation
A crucial assumption for identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects of NATO bombing on Croatian tourism
outcomes is the parallel trend assumption. Intuitively, treated units—ﬁrms in the tourism sector—
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Figure 2: Histogram of Log Revenues
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Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
and control units—ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector—should have parallel pretreatment trends in
terms of outcome. If this assumption holds, one can infer what an outcome of a counterfactual
treated unit—outcome of a treated unit had the treatment not occurred—would look like. There-
fore, the estimation of a causal eﬀect would be a simple comparison of the outcome of the treated
unit and the counterfactual outcome of the treated unit.
We take ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector as control units as we argue that manufacturing should
not be aﬀected directly by the NATO bombing. In order to reinforce the decision to take manu-
facturing as the nontreated sector, we show Figure 3 which clearly indicates that ﬁrms in tourism
and manufacturing do follow a pretreatment parallel trend in terms of log revenues.
Although the validity of parallel trends enables us to estimate the causal eﬀect of interest, we argue
that the estimated object is in fact a lower bound of the eﬀect of NATO bombing on Croatian
tourism. Although the manufacturing sector should not be aﬀected directly by war proximity,
there are a number of general-equilibrium channels which could adversely aﬀect the manufacturing
businesses. For example, lower revenues from tourism might decrease internal demand for manufac-
turing products. Therefore, if the control units are adversely aﬀected by the NATO bombing, then
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the estimated eﬀect is actually lower than the true eﬀect. Hence, as we argue that war proximity
did not aﬀect manufacturing in a positive way, the true eﬀect of NATO bombing on tourism-ﬁrm
performance is at least equal to the estimates we present.
Figure 3: Revenues of Manufacturing and Tourism Industries
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Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
Our identiﬁcation strategy also uses two interesting characteristics of the quasi-experiment we ex-
plore. First, the NATO bombing of Serbia due to the Kosovo conﬂict happened exactly three
months before the peak of the tourist season, from March to June 1999. This was a one-oﬀ event
that appeared only in 1999 and that could aﬀect only the tourist season of 1999. In the years
before and after the conﬂict, tourism was growing steadily. Second, Croatian Adriatic counties (in
which most of Croatian tourism is concentrated) have an interesting geography. The seven counties
are stacked one on top of another starting with Istria on the north-west, reaching all the way to
the Dubrovnik-Neretva county on the south-east. The distance between the utmost north and the
utmost south point is more than 450 kilometers, which gives us substantial variation in proximity
to NATO bombing sites (Figure 1).
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These two characteristics enable an analysis of not only the size of the eﬀect for diﬀerent ﬁrms but
also an analysis of potential channels through which conﬂict operates. Mainly, we are interested if
the adverse eﬀects are channeled through geographical proximity to the conﬂict-inﬂicted area.
5 Results
In this section we establish the eﬀect of NATO bombing on revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating Equation 1 using diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and time
frames. In particular, models in columns (1) to (3) use a larger data sample—from 1993 to 1999,
while models in columns (4) to (6) use a two-period model with only 1998 and 1999 data. Within
the speciﬁc time frame, the models diﬀer in terms of covariate inclusion: models in column (1)
and (4) use no covariates, (2) and (5) include location and subsector ﬁxed eﬀects, while models
in column (3) and (6) also include the number of employees, assets and debt (which could be
viewed as bad controls as they could be aﬀected by the treatment—bombing). We present results
from diﬀerent speciﬁcations in order to automatically embed robustness checks, but our preferred
speciﬁcation is presented in column (5).
Table 2 provides compelling evidence of severe signiﬁcant adverse eﬀect of NATO bombing on
revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector. For example, our preferred speciﬁcation, presented in
column (5), indicates that tourism experienced a 16.6% drop in revenues due to NATO bombing.
This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and other speciﬁcations indicate that the eﬀect
is indeed adverse and signiﬁcant, ranging from -16.6% to -23.4%. As already mentioned in the
Identiﬁcation section, we view this estimate as the lower bound of the true eﬀect as the control
units—ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector—could also be adversely aﬀected by NATO bombing via
general-equilibrium channels.
In order to document the eﬀect in more detail, we also explore whether this overall eﬀect is coming
either from: (i) accommodation or (ii) food and beverage service activities (which are subcategories
of the tourism sector according to the Croatian NACE classiﬁcation). Tables 3 and 4, which
present results using our preferred speciﬁcation (Model (5)), indicate that overall adverse eﬀects
came mostly from accommodation activities, especially hotels, where revenues dropped by 33.6%.
On the other hand, the eﬀect on food and beverage service activities, although negative, is not
statistically signiﬁcant. The negative eﬀect on beverage activities, i.e. bars and coﬀee shops, is
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Table 2: Eﬀect of Kosovo Bombings on Revenues in Tourism Sector
Dependent variable: log revenues
1993–1999 sample 1998–1999 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated sector x Treated period −0.234∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −0.166∗∗ −0.180∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Treated sector −0.706∗∗∗ −0.643∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗ −0.767∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗∗ −0.739∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.152) (0.147) (0.091) (0.182) (0.176)
Treated period 0.008 0.036 0.035 −0.038 −0.029 −0.001
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Employment — — 0.011∗∗∗ — — 0.012∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001)
Long-term assets — — 0.000 — — 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Long-term debt — — 0.000∗∗∗ — — 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
County ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
3-digit NACE code eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 38,463 38,463 35,482 14,177 14,177 14,131
Note: Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are in brackets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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statistically signiﬁcant though, implying that adverse eﬀects are dominantly coming from hotels,
and alternatively from beverage activities. The result that the adverse eﬀect in tourism is driven
by a drop in revenues of accommodation business and not restaurant businesses could probably be
explained by the fact that accommodation establishments are mostly frequented by foreign tourists
while restaurants are visited by both domestic and foreign tourists, and for reasons other than
tourism, e.g. business, leisure, everyday nourishment.
Figure 4 explores heterogeneous eﬀects with respect to the pretreatment ﬁrm size in terms of
employment. The results indicate that larger ﬁrms (50 or more employees) experienced the most
drastic drop in revenues. Note that the absence of a signiﬁcant eﬀect for ﬁrms of smaller size might
come from larger standard errors due to reduced sample sizes. We also inspect the heterogeneity
of the eﬀect with respect to ownership type (private vs. mixed/state-owned) and do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences3.
Table 3: Heterogeneous Results: Accommodation and Subcategories
Dependent variable: log revenues
All types of ac-
commodation
Hotels Vacation
establishments
Camping sites Other ac-
commodation
Treated sector x Treated period −0.293∗∗ −0.336∗∗ −0.236 0.351 −0.572
(0.137) (0.159) (0.385) (0.316) (0.731)
Treated sector 0.632∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗∗ −1.785∗∗∗ −0.473 −0.353
(0.227) (0.230) (0.601) (0.694) (0.608)
Treated period −0.030 −0.029 −0.028 −0.028 −0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
County ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,094 11,908 11,553 11,526 11,490
Notes: Estimation includes the 1998–1999 period for all models. Columns two, three, four and ﬁve represent subcat-
egories of the ﬁrst column. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are in brackets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
3Figure is omitted due to brevity.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Results: Food and Beverage Service Activities and Subcategories
Dependent variable: log revenues
All food and
beverage service
activities
Restaurants Catering and
other food
service activities
Beverage service
activities
Treated sector x Treated period −0.113 −0.015 0.237 −0.195∗∗
(0.079) (0.140) (0.273) (0.094)
Treated sector −1.032∗∗∗ −0.804∗∗∗ −0.610 −1.174∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.170) (0.686) (0.121)
Treated period −0.028 −0.028 −0.027 −0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
County ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,544 12,241 11,520 12,705
Notes: Estimation includes the 1998–1999 period for all models. Columns two, three, four and ﬁve represent subcat-
egories of the ﬁrst column. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are in brackets.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4: Revenues of Manufacturing and Tourism Industries
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Notes: Dots present point estimates (δDD from Equation 1), while bars present 95% conﬁdence
intervals based on standard errors clustered on the ﬁrm level. Estimation is based on the model
using the 1998–1999 sample, with county, municipality and 3-digit NACE ﬁxed eﬀects.
Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
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6 Channel of Adverse Eﬀect: Proximity or Perception
So far we have established that NATO bombing has indeed adversely aﬀected the business per-
formance of ﬁrms in the tourism sector. As presented in the previous section, this adverse eﬀect
is mostly generated in the accommodation service business (hotels) and in ﬁrms with 50 or more
employees.
In this section we explore whether the channel of proximity is relevant in explaining the intensity
of the eﬀect within the country. We take advantage of the speciﬁc north-west to south-east orien-
tation of Croatian Adriatic counties in order to analyze the eﬀect of proximity using the following
equation:
(2)Yistl = α+ θdistil + β1treatis + γ1postit + β2(treatis × distil) + γ2(postit × distil)
+ δ(treatis × postit) + λ(treatis × postit × distil) + ζl + ηs ++eistl
where all the variables are the same ones as in Equation 1, with addition of distil which represents
the geographical distance between ﬁrm i’s location l and the capital of Kosovo—Prishtina4. We
construct this variable as the geographical distance between the centeroid of the municipality in
which ﬁrm i reported its headquarters and the geographical location of Prishtina5. Therefore λ
represents the intensity of the eﬀect with respect to the proximity to bombing sites. Note that this
estimation implies that the intensity is linear in its nature, an assumption we will depart from later
on by adopting a more ﬂexible estimation procedure.
Before presenting the results of estimating Equation 2, we present the histogram of distance from
Kosovo in kilometers (Figure 5). Distance ranges from 230.5 kilometers (Konavle in the Dubrovnik-
Neretva county) to 682.5 kilometers (Umag in the Istria county), both of which are municipalities
largely engaged in tourism activities. The spikes in the mass observed in Figure 5 come from the
concentration of economic activity in particular locations. For example, ﬁrms are concentrated in
and around the largest three cities in Croatia: Split (389 km distance), Zagreb (540 km distance)
and Rijeka (615 km distance) which is reﬂected by spikes in the histogram of distance.
Results for Equation 2 are presented in Table 5. Columns (1) to (3) present the results for whole
Croatia, while columns (4) to (6)—where we exploit the northwest-southeast orientation of the
Croatian coast—contain only models which use the seven Adriatic counties. Models also diﬀer in
4Note that we could have chosen other geographical locations, but the source of heterogeneity would not change,
as using diﬀerent locations to construct proximity would only be a monotonic transformation of the one we use.
5This implies that location ﬁxed eﬀects ζl cannot be at the municipality level as the municipality is used to
construct the proximity to NATO bombing. Instead we use county ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Figure 5: Histogram of Firm’s Distance from Kosovo (in km)
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Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
the inclusion of covariates. The results indicate that the intensity of the eﬀect of NATO bomb-
ing on revenues of ﬁrms in the tourism sector does not signiﬁcantly vary with distance from the
bombing sites. The estimated eﬀect cannot be statistically distinguished from zero in either of the
speciﬁcations.
In order to further explore the nexus between the proximity and the adverse eﬀect, we split our
sample according to the distance from Prishtina and run our preferred speciﬁcation. This enables
us to explore this channel in a more ﬂexible manner. Results for whole Croatia and for the Adriatic
Croatia are presented in Figures 6 and 7, and they indicate that no signiﬁcant heterogeneity, with
respect to distance, is recorded. Although point estimates do diﬀer, indicating that the strongest
adverse eﬀects were experienced by ﬁrms with headquarters 300 to 400 kilometers from Prishtina,
the fact that the 95% conﬁdence intervals overlap in each case suggests that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that proximity is not relevant in explaining the intensity of the eﬀect. While this might
come from relatively high standard errors, we argue this evidence is compelling enough to conclude
that within-country proximity to conﬂict is not a signiﬁcant channel of the adverse eﬀect.
Other evidence of the claim that proximity is not a signiﬁcant channel of the adverse eﬀect comes
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Table 5: Intensity of the Eﬀect with Respect to Distance
Dependent variable: log revenues
Whole Croatia Adriatic Croatia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated sector x Treated period x Distance 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.0001 0.00001 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
3-digit NACE code eﬀects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Employment, assets and debt No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 14,177 14,177 14,131 4,714 4,714 4,700
Notes: Treated sector x Treated period x Distance is λ from Equation 2. Estimation includes the 1998–1999 period
for all models. Estimates using the whole Croatia sample include all 21 Croatian counties, while Adriatic Croatia
includes seven Adriatic counties. Standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level are in brackets.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 6: Distance from the Bombings and the Size of the Eﬀect
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Notes: Dots present point estimates (δDD from Equation 1), while bars present 95% conﬁdence
intervals based on standard errors clustered on the ﬁrm level. Estimation is based on the model
using the 1998–1999 sample, with county and 3-digit NACE ﬁxed eﬀects.
Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
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Figure 7: Distance from the Bombings and the Size of the Eﬀect: Accommodation
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Notes: Dots present point estimates (δDD from Equation 1), while bars present 95% conﬁdence
intervals based on standard errors clustered on the ﬁrm level. Estimation is based on the model
using the 1998–1999 sample, with county ﬁxed eﬀects.
Source: The Institute of Economics, Zagreb.
19
Figure 8: Distance from the Bombings and the Size of the Eﬀect: Accommodation
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Source: Eurostat.
from outside Croatian borders. It seems that only one other competitor country (out of a pool of
countries for which we have data) suﬀered losses during 1999. That country was Slovenia and in
that year it lost around 45,000 tourists (Figure 8). Although the size of the impact in Slovenia was
much smaller than in Croatia, we have to take into account that Slovenia is not as big a tourist
destination as Croatia. All other countries from our sample recorded signiﬁcant increases in the
number of tourist arrivals and nights spent. These developments suggest that Slovenia as well as
Croatia was perceived as an insecure destination, possibly as both countries were part of Yugoslavia
(a country then being bombed by NATO) just eight years earlier.
Figure 8 also corroborates the absence of the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial crisis eﬀect on tourism in
general. According to the ﬁgures for Spain, Cyprus, Greece, France, Italy, and Portugal, the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis did not have an adverse inﬂuence in 1998 as the recovery was swift.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to illuminate the impact of conﬂicts on consumer behavior on the
tourism market. Although we do a single-country study and explore the Croatian tourism sector,
we ﬁnd that our study is relevant in an international context as well. Due to frequent crisis events
in popular tourist destinations (e.g. attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, France, Spain, etc.), we believe our
research can provide useful insights, despite the fact that we explore the impacts of a longer-term
conﬂict that culminated in NATO military intervention.
The results we obtain are expected—there is a large negative eﬀect of conﬂict on tourism—but
we contribute to the literature by exploring whether the adverse eﬀects within the country are
channeled through proximity to conﬂict areas. By analyzing heterogeneous eﬀects with respect to
the distance of the ﬁrm from Kosovo, we argue that within-country proximity to conﬂict is not
a signiﬁcant channel through which the negative eﬀect propagates. This essentially suggests that
conﬂict or possibly even war, or an act of terrorism, has far-reaching eﬀects that go beyond simple
geographical proximity to the conﬂict. There are obviously other channels that drive tourists away
form certain destinations, one of which may possibly be perception. We speculate that foreign
tourists could have perceived Croatia as part of an unstable region as only a few years had passed
since 1991 and the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. This view, driven by conﬂict more than 600
kilometers away, potentially led them away from Croatia as a tourism destination.
Apart from the novel channel of adverse eﬀect of conﬂict on tourism, we also ﬁnd this type of
identiﬁcation-based empirical work useful in tourism research. Using the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
identiﬁcation strategy enabled us to measure the causal eﬀect on a tourism outcome, not just
simple correlations, as is normally the case in tourism research. The approach taken here allows
us to answer the “what if” type of questions, e.g.: “How many tourist arrivals would there have
been if NATO had not bombed Kosovo?”. We believe that this research is just the beginning of
extended use of identiﬁcation-based empirical work in tourism research as the beneﬁts are large—
from valuable policy applications to deeper understanding of tourism.
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